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NOTES
THE RIGHTS OF A TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AS AGAINST
A FEDERAL TAX LIEN
In the recent case of In the Matter of Fidelity Tube Corp.,' the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a trustee in bankruptcy was not a
judgment creditor within the meaning of section 3672 of the 1939 Inter-
nal Revenue Code. - While this is not a shocking decision considering the
Supreme Court's decision in the case of United States v. Gilbert Associ-
ates, Inc.,3 it is noteworthy in that the Circuit Court successfully distin-
guished the Gilbert case from a case involving a trustee in bankruptcy4
and still held the trustee was not a judgment creditor for purposes of sec-
tion 3672 of the Code. When one considers the increasing frequency of
bankruptcy in the United States' and the relatively small proportion of
bankruptcies which are asset cases,6 this decision can have devastating
consequences for any of the first three priority claimants under section
64a7 of the Bankruptcy Act. Unless the trustee can prevail over the
federal tax lien, the chances of any of these claimants collecting their
1. 28 U.S.L. Week 2555 (3d Cir. 1959). Affirming on rehearing before the court
en banc the case reported in 59-2 U.S.T.C. 9683.
2. Now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
3. 345 U.S. 361 (1953). In that case the Supreme Court said, "We think Congress
used the words 'judgment creditor' in Section 3672 in the usual, conventional sense of
a judgment of a court of record." Id. at 364.
4. The court said, "[T]he Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert was motivated by a
desire to procure uniformity among the States in determining questions relating to pri-
ority of payment of lien claims and that the Supreme Court ruled as it did because it
feared that if each State was left free to designate who was or who was not a 'judgment
creditor' under their respective laws there would be lack of uniformity. . . . [U]nder
Section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act there is no danger of heterogeneity since we are con-
struing federal and not State law and that therefore the Gilbert decision is not apposite."
In the Matter of Fidelity Tube Corporation, supra note 1.
5. Using 1945 (the all time low in the number of cases filed for bankruptcy in the
United States since 1905) as the base point, the number of bankruptcies has risen at an
almost fantastic rate until in 1958 there were approximately 92 thousand cases filed in
the District Courts of the United States. (About 22 thousand cases more than in 1932
which was the worst year of the depression.) 32 REF. J. 124 (1958).
6. A no asset case is one in which, after outstanding liens are paid, there is nothing
to distribute to the general creditors. From the years 1946 to 1957, in cases where the
bankrupt was given a discharge of his debts, slightly over 15% of the cases have been
asset cases. Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts for years 1946-57.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 104. These priorities include many classes of expenses but they
can be briefly summarized as: (1) Expenses for preserving and administering the
estate, (2) Wages owed to certain classes of wage claimants, and (3) Expenses for
successful opposition to an arrangement or discharge, or for adducing evidence leading
to a conviction of a bankruptcy violation.
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claims are greatly diminished. While neither the general creditor8 (ex-
cepting the first three classes of priority claimants) nor the secured credi-
tor9 could have hoped to benefit from a contrary result in the Fidelity
Tube case, these three classes of priority claimants could very well expect
to prevail over the government in similar cases had the result been dif-
ferent,1" and if other courts would accept the result in the light of the
Gilbert case.
Section 6321 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code" provides a lien
for all taxes owing the United States, which will attach to any interest in
property the taxpayer may have.12  This lien arises at the time the as-
sessment is made' and continues "until it is satisfied or becomes un-
enforceable by reason of lapse of time."' 4  By its very nature and the
method by which it arises,'5 the lien is secret as to persons dealing with
the delinquent taxpayer, and these persons can do nothing to inform them-
8. The general creditor will take only after all valid liens and priorities have been
satisfied. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §§ 60.01, 64.02, (14th ed. 1941) [hereinafter
cited as CoLLiER]; City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U.S. 174 (1919). Since the Bank-
ruptcy Act § 64a gives the government a fourth priority for taxes, the government
would still take ahead of the general creditors under its priority.
9. As to secured creditors, ordinarily one would expect a junior lienor to advance
when a senior lienor's lien has been defeated. However, due to the preservation clause
of the Bankruptcy Act § 67a(3), the trustee is in effect subrogated into the shoes of
the senior lienor as against junior lienors, and he preserves it for the benefit of the
estate. White v. Steinman, 120 F.2d 799 (2d Cir.) cert. denied 314 U.S. 659 (1941).
10. If the court had held the trustee in bankruptcy to be a judgment creditor under
INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1939, § 3672, he could claim protection from the government if the tax
lien were not filed in the proper office.
11. Formerly INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 3670.
12. "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property
and rights to property, . . . belonging to such person." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.
For an excellent discussion of this lien see Anderson, Federal Tax Liens-Their Nature
and Priority, 41 CAL. L. REV. 241 (1953). See also 9 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOmE TAXA-
TION §§ 54.38-54.46, (1956) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6322. Under the 1939 Code, the lien did not arise un-
til the assessment lists were received by the collector. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 3671.
A tax assessment is a culmination of an administrative determination as to a particular
person's liability to the government. This is very much like a judgment of a court, and
the lien that arises under § 6321 can be favorably compared to a judgment lien. See 9
MERTENS § 54.38. See also Anderson, supra note 12.
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323. Federal claims are not affected by state limi-
tation periods. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940). Thus unless there is
fraud or failure to file a return for which there is no period of limitation, collection
must be begun within six years after assessment of the tax liability. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 6501. See also 9 MERTENS § 54.38 nn.20 & 21.
15. Although the date of the effectiveness of the lien is the date of assessment, the
event which causes the lien to arise is demand. 9 MERTENS § 54.40. After demand, the
effective date relates back to the date of assessment. 9 MERTENS § 54.38. Since the
records of the assessment and demand cannot be inspected except on order of the Presi-
dent or under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate and ap-
proved by the President, INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 6103, it is obvious that unless the
lien is recorded, it is secret and effective as against everyone but those protected by §
6323. In re Litt, 128 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Pa. 1955) ; 9 MERTENS § 54.40.
NOTES
selves of the lien's existence. 6 To at least partially mitigate the harsh
effect of such a lien, Congress, in 1913," amended the provision so as
to make it invalid as against a mortgagee," purchaser, 9 or judgment
creditor 0 unless notice of the lien was filed in the proper office.2' In
1939, as a result of the Rosenfield case 2 2 pledgees were added to the se-
lect group.
Another factor which has to a small degree mitigated the effect of
the lien has been court construction of section 6321. Statutory liens for
taxes are very strictly construed. 3 Consequently, if the government does
not meet all the requirements of the statute, the lien will never arise,
2 4
and the first three priority classes under section 64a of the Bankruptcy
Act will take ahead of the government.2" Because of the liberal provisions
in the Bankruptcy Act allowing for lien perfection, however, it would be
rare indeed if the government would fail to perfect its lien in a bankruptcy
situation.2" Thus these three classes of claimants really have little hope
apart from the trustee.
The trustee in a normal case is fairly well equipped to preserve a
good portion of the bankrupt's estate for the general creditors, thanks to
16. See United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893) where the Court held that
federal tax liens were not subject to state recording statutes, and that the prior un-
recorded tax lien would beat even a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration.
17. 37 STAT. 1016 (1913).
18. It appears, however, that only mortgagees in the conventional sense are pro-
tected. See United States v. Ball Construction Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
19. A purchaser within the meaning of § 6323 is one who acquires title for valu-
able consideration in the manner of vendor and vendee. United States v. Scovil, 348
U.S. 218 (1954).
20. A judgment creditor within the meaning of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323,
is one who holds a judgment of a court of record in the usual and conventional sense.
United States v. Gilbert Associates, supra note 3. When a person becomes a judgment
creditor for purposes of § 6323 of the Code is not a matter of state law. United States
v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955) ; United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47
(1950).
21. The proper office is a matter of state law, and notice of the lien must be filed
in the office designated by that state in which the property subject to the lien is located.
If the state has made no provision for filing of the lien, it must be filed with the clerk
of the district court for the district in which the property is located. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 6323.
22. United States v. Rosenfield, 26 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1938).
23. MacKenzie v. United States, 109 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1940) ; In re Crockett, 150
F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1957); In re Holdsworth, 113 F. Supp. 878 (D.N.J. 1953).
24. However the courts sometimes fail to require strict compliance with the statute.
Although the Code requires demand for the lien to be effective, this need not be a formal
demand. In re Baltimore Pearl Hominy Co., 5 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1925).
25. The government would then be relegated to its priority status under the Bank-
ruptcy Act § 64a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104a.
26. Bankruptcy Act § 67b; 11 U.S.C. § 107b, provides that notwithstanding § 60
of the Act, certain statutory liens, including a lien for taxes, may be valid against the
trustee even though arising or perfected while the debtor was insolvent and within four
months of bankruptcy. Also if there is a filing of notice of the lien as required by local
statute, the Act even permits perfection after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
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Sections 60a, 67a, 67c, 70c, and 70e of the Bankruptcy Act. Section
60a deals with preferences. In many cases a federal tax lien would in
theory fall under this provision, and the trustee could thereby avoid the
lien as a preference." However, Congress has effectively blocked the
trustee from this avenue with the passage of section 67b, which provides
a sweeping validation of statutory liens, including those for taxes, as
against the trustee.2" Thus the trustee must look elsewhere to attack the
federal tax lien.
Section 67a has essentially the same effect as section 60a except that
67a is aimed at liens obtained by legal or equitable proceedings rather
than preferences. This section is also aimed at fraudulent transfers, and
a preference is not necessarily fraudulent.29 The use of this section, how-
ever, is not relevant to federal tax liens because the federal lien is statu-
tory and not obtained by legal or equitable proceedings.
Section 67c of the Bankruptcy Act provides some hope for the trus-
tee even though it is very slight and very limited. The gist of this sec-
tion is that when the statutory lien, including one for taxes, is on per-
sonal property not accompanied by possession; or where the lien has not
been enforced by sale prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, it
will be postponed in payment to the first two classes of priorities defined
in section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act." By its very terms, this section is
of limited value to the trustee because it applies only to personal prop-
erty." Since the tax lien applies to all the debtor's property,2 section 67c
27. In 3 COLLIER §§ 60.07, 60.09 it is stated that after 1938 involuntary as well as
voluntary transfers were considered preferences if the other elements were present.
§ 60.12 says that statutory liens also should have been considered preferences, but never
have been because of the Bankruptcy Act § 67b; 11 U.S.C. § 107b.
28. ". . . . statutory liens for taxes and debts owing to the United States or to
any State or any subdivision thereof . . . . may be valid against the trustee, even
though arising or perfected while the debtor was insolvent and within four months prior
to the filing of the petition ....... Bankruptcy Act § 67b; 11 U.S.C. § 107b; See also
3 COLLIER § 60.12.
29. Van Iderstine v. Nat'l Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913); 3 COLLIER §
60.03.
30. "Where not enforced by sale before the filing of a petition . . . (1) Though
valid against the trustee under subdivision b of this section, statutory liens, including
liens for taxes or debts owing to the United States . . . on personal property not ac-
companied by possession of such property . . . shall be postponed in payment to the
debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision a of section 64 of this Act .
11 U.S.C. § 107c.
Clause (1) of § 64a is a detailed list of expenses that can generally be classed as
administration expenses.
Clause (2) of § 64a includes wages not to exceed $600 to each claimant which have
been earned within three months of bankruptcy.
31. The provisions of § 67c of the Bankruptcy Act do not apply to real property.
In re Pa. Central Brewing Co., 114 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. denied sub. nom. 312
U.S. 685 (1941). It also appears that the provision applies only to tangible personal
property. United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955).
NOTES
would probably be small consolation to the trustee when and if he ever
got the chance to use it.33
Section 70c would initially appear to be the trustee's strongest line
of attack against the federal tax lien. This section gives the trustee the
status of a creditor holding a lien through legal or equitable proceedings."
In many cases, the trustee has been given all the rights of this hypotheti-
cal creditor, even in cases where equity would seem to demand a relaxa-
tion of such a stringent rule.3" When dealing with federal tax liens,
however, because the magic words "judgment creditor" were not used in
section 70c,3" the courts have done an abrupt about face with regard to
the trustee's powers, and have generally held him not to be a judgment
creditor for purposes of section 6323 of the Code." While there was
conflict on this point for a time,"8 it now appears that the Gilbert case"
and the Fidelity Tube case4" have settled the issue in favor of the conten-
tion that the trustee is not a judgment creditor within the meaning of
section 6323.
The trustee's final line of attack lies in section 70e of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Under this section, it would appear at first glance, that the
32. The lien attaches to after acquired property also. Glass City Bank v. United
States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
33. The fact that the Bankruptcy Act, § 67c is not really an effective remedy is
shown by the small number of cases where the tax lien was defeated. Freeman v. Mayer,
253 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1958) ; In re George Shirt Co., 162 F. Supp. 749 (D. Md. 1958).
34. ". . . . The trustee, as to all property, . . . upon which a creditor of the
bankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bank-
ruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers
of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not such a
creditor actually exists." Bankruptcy Act § 70c; 11 U.S.C. § 110c.
35. E.g., McKay v. Trusco Finance Co., 198 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Hoffman v.
Cream-O-Products, 180 F.2d 649 (2d Cir., 1950) ; Jubas v. Sampsell, 185 F.2d 333 (9th
Cir. 1950) ; McGuire v. Gorbaty Brothers, 133 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Guterman v.
Rice, 121 F.2d 251 (1st Cir. 1941).
36. The Act says, "creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings [re-
ferring to legal or equitable proceedings] ... " Bankruptcy Act § 70c; 11 U.S.C. §
110c. See note 34 supra.
37. In addition to the requirement that the creditor have a judgment of a court of
record, United States v. Gilbert Associates, supra note 3, the courts have also required
that the judgment creditor take steps under state law to reduce his judgment to a lien
on specific property. If he does not, but merely relies on his judgment, he cannot pre-
vail over the federal tax lien. Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1948)
United States v. Levin, 128 F. Supp. 465 (D. Md. 1955).
38. For cases holding the trustee to be a judgment creditor within the meaning of
the INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 3672, see: Barish v. Cent. School Dist., 32 A.F.T.R. 1604
(S.D.N.Y. 1943); United States v. Sands, 174 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1949) (dictum). For
cases contra, see: Burst v. Sturr, 237 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1956) which overruled the dic-
tum in United States v. Sands, supra; United States v. England, 226 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.
1955) ; In the Matter of Green, 124 F. Supp. 481 (S.D. Ala. 1954) ; In re Taylorcraft
Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948); In the Matter of Fidelity Tube Corp.,
supra note 1.
39. See note 3 supra.
40. See note 1 supra.
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trustee might have an excellent chance to prevail over the federal tax lien.
Section 70e provides:
A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred by a debtor
adjudged a bankrupt under this Act which, under any Federal
or State law applicable thereto, is fraudulent as against or void-
able for any other reason by any creditor of the debtor, having
a claim provable under this Act, shall be null and void as
against the trustee of such debtor.4 '
Thus it appears that all the trustee would have to do is find a creditor
would could avoid the federal lien, and it would be void as to the trustee.42
A brief look at the cases where other creditors have done battle with the
federal tax lien (aside from the four classes of creditors protected from
the secrecy of the federal lien) , however, reveals that the chances against
the trustee finding such a creditor are very slim indeed.4
The government has had, since 1789,"5 a statutory priority which pro-
vides, in essence, that in any case of insolvency the debts due the United
States shall be satisfied first.4" This statute has always been construed
liberally in favor of the government,47 and in 1929,48 the Supreme Court
41. 11 U.S.C. § 110e.
42. In Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), the Court said, "... Claim for want of
record or for other reasons [which] would not have been valid liens as against the claims
of the creditors of the bankrupt shall not be liens against his estate . . . ." Id. at 4.
While I have found no cases specifically holding that the doctrine of Moore v. Bay,
would apply as to a federal tax lien, there is no good reason why it should not because
the doctrine will invalidate all other types of specific and perfected liens if the trustee
can find a single creditor who can avoid the competing lien. E.g., It re Central Metallic
Casket Co., 170 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Wisc. 1959); Exchange Bank of America v. Mo.,
222 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1955). See also 4 COLLIER § 70.69. For a good article advocating
the retention of the rule of Moore v. Bay, see Schwartz, Moore v. Bay-Should Its Rule
Be Abolished?, 29 REF. J. 67 (1955).
43. These are mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, and judgment creditors. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
44. See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Perni-
cious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L. J. 905 (1954) ; Cross, Federal
Tax Clainms: Nature and Effect of the Government's Weapons for Collection, 27 FORD-
HAm L. REv. 1 (1958). See also the Note, 30 Irn. L.J. 476 (1955).
45. 1 STAT. 42 § 21 (1789). After three minor changes, the statutory priority was
codified in the Revised Statutes. REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191.
46. "Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, . . . the
debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied. . . ." Ev. STAT. § 3466, 31 U.S.C.
§ 191. This provision does not apply in a bankruptcy proceeding however. See, United
States v. Gargill, 218 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1955). A real problem arises in this connection,
however, if the government's tax claim is also a lien. See Note, 108 U. OF PA. L. REv.
77 (1959).
47. Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 102, 137 (1838). However the
Court had always taken great pains to emphasize that the Act did not establish a lien.
Thus the priority did not prevail over a bona fide transfer of property or over an estab-
lished lien. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 73 (1805) ; Brent v. Bank, 35
U.S. (10 Pet.) 596 (1836). For an excellent discussion of the history and character of
REV. STAT. § 3466, see Kennedy, supra note 44.
NOTES
embarked upon an even greater expansion of the priority by announcing
the inchoate lien doctrine.49 By reading the priority statute in pari materia
with the lien provision of the Internal Revenue Code,"° the Court has
concluded that only a prior lien which is choate should prevail over the
federal tax lien." In the thirty years which have elapsed since this doc-
trine was promulgated, the Supreme Court has on only one occasion
found the competing lien choate under federal standards."
Thus we see that when the trustee is deprived of his status as a
judgment creditor under section 6323 of the Code, his chances against
the federal tax lien are meager indeed. He has a chance under section
70e of the Bankruptcy Act, but that depends on his finding a creditor
who can prevail over the lien under section 6323 of the Code. He will
prevail under section 67c of the Bankruptcy Act, but that depends on the
fact that the lien is on personal property not in possession. As a practical
matter most if not all of the trustee's weapons have been silenced either
as a result of statutes or judicial interpretation."3
The reason the courts usually give for favoring the government is
48. Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
49. The inchoate lien doctrine says in essence that a competing lien must have been
specific and perfected before the federal priority attached or the priority will prevail.
United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941) ; New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290 (1933).
Whether or not a lien is specific and perfected is always a federal question, United
States v. Wadill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945) ; United States v. Gilbert
Associates, Inc., supra note 3. The Court finally set down definite standards for speci-
ficity and perfection in Ill. ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946), where it
said, (1) the lienor must be identified, (2) the amount of the lien must be certain, and
(3) the property to which the lien attaches must be definite. The Court implied that a
transfer of title or possession might also be necessary. This implication was later made
a condition of specificity in United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., supra.
50. United States v. Liverpool and London and Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 214
(1955) ; United States v. Acri, supra note 20; United States v. Security Trust & Say.
Bank, supra note 20.
51. The Court said in the Security Trust case, supra note 20, "[W]e hold that the
tax liens of the United States are superior to the inchoate attachment lien of Morri-
son .... Id. at 51. (Emphasis added.)
52. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954). However, even in
that case, the fact that the Court accepted the state court's characterization of the lien
as specific and perfected did not allow the state's lien to prevail.
53. Section 67b of the Bankruptcy Act nullifies the use of Section 60a, because it
provides for a sweeping validation of statutory liens. Section 67a of the Bankruptcy Act
is not relevant because a federal tax lien is statutory rather than one obtained by legal or
equitable proceedings. The interpretation placed on § 6323 of the Code effectively nulli-
fies § 70c of the Bankruptcy Act as a useful weapon because unless the trustee is con-
sidered a judgment creditor for purposes of § 6323, the fact that he is a judgment credi-
tor for other purposes is irrelevant. Finally the creation of the inchoate lien doctrine in
construing § 3466 of the Revised Statutes, see notes 49-52 supra, removes a great deal
of the effectiveness of § 70e because it will be almost impossible for the trustee to find
a creditor who can avoid the federal lien under state law. If the trustee cannot find
such a creditor, § 70e and the rule of Moore v. Bay, supra note 42, will not apply.
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to protect the government revenues.54 But this policy of protecting the
government revenues has not always been so overriding as to outweigh
all the equities on the other side. Both Congress and the Supreme Court
have allowed the policy to fall by the wayside in actions brought under
the Tort Claims Act.5 The court has said that when the government is
made to stand the loss, the resulting burden on each taxpayer is relatively
slight; but when the entire burden falls on the injured party, it may leave
him destitute." As a policy matter, analogous reasoning could be ap-
plied in bankruptcy cases, 7 and the courts could allow the trustee his
status as a judgment creditor even under section 6323 of the Code. In
addition to being more just and equitable,5" such a result would probably
be more in harmony with the overall policy of the Code and the Bank-
ruptcy Act.5" If recording is an effective means for warning other credi-
54. See dicta in Glass City Bank v. United States, supra note 32; United States v.
Phillips, 267 F.2d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1959) ; United States v. Barndollar & Crosbie, 166
F.2d 793, 794 (10th Cir. 1948).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
56. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957).
57. It could be argued that the government, by its negligence in not recording,
lured unsuspecting creditors into a false sense of security, and thereby they consented
to become unsecured creditors of the bankrupt. Such a loss resulting could be more
easily spread over the whole country than to cause one creditor, or in the case of bank-
ruptcy, all the creditors as represented by the trustee, to stand it and lose their whole
claim.
58. Although this statement is essentially a value judgment, it is not one of personal
bias alone. There has been growing discontent with the Supreme Court's position of
constantly protecting the Government's claims at the expense of innocent businessmen.
Many think this has disrupted commerce already and is potentially an even greater threat
when businessmen begin to take account of the added risks due to this Court position.
See MacLachlan, Improving the Law of Federal Liens and Priorities, 1 BOSTON COLLEGE
IND. & Com. L. REv. 73 (1959). The Court's attitude has also incensed the practicing
bar to the point that the American Bar Association has recommended new legislation to
the present Congress in order to relax the stringent position the Court has taken. The
Bar Association's Bill, H.R. 7915, along with three other identical Bills, H.R. 7914, H.R.
8406, and S. 2305, are in committee at the date of this writing. The gist of the 66 page
bill is to expand the classes of security protected under § 6323; to give certain types of
security and purchasers absolute protection against the government's lien; to mitigate
the complete priority of the government under § 3466 of the Revised Statutes so that it
is subject to five classes of expenses which are similar to the bankruptcy priorities in
§ 64a; and to have the government consent to be sued in actions affecting property in
which it has a lien or interest.
59. The policy and fundamental principle of the Bankruptcy Act is equality of dis-
tribution. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941) ; In re As-
sociated Gas & Electric Co., 149 F.2d 996, (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. twm. 326 U.S. 736
(1945). The policy of the INT. REv. CODE seems to be to eliminate the harshness of the
secret lien at least as to the four classes of creditors named in § 6323. In the Matter of
Martin Woodcraft Corp., 130 F. Supp. 443, 444 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd sub. iwm. 229
F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1956). In that case the court said, "The sole function of the filing of
the lien is giving notice." Cf. Pipola v. Chicco, 169 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
where the court said, "The very purpose of the lien-filing provision is to give notice to
would-be purchasers of the government's right to collect taxes due from the owners of
the property."
NOTES
tors of secret liens, and Congress obviously has assumed recording is ef-
fective by enacting section 6323, the courts should not allow the govern-
ment to continue luring other creditors into a trap by adhering to the
policy of protecting government revenues when recording machinery has
been provided whereby notice of the secret lien can be given to the world.
The courts should simply interpret the language of both the Bankruptcy
Act and the Internal Revenue Code according to their plain meaning and
hold the trustee to be a judgment creditor"0 within the meaning of sec-
tion 6323. Congress has provided protection for four classes of credi-
tors, but court construction has unduly narrowed these classes."' If the
government lien is secret, it is secret as to anybody dealing with the bank-
rupt, and since Congress has protected judgment creditors from secret
liens, the trustee should be allowed his rights under the Bankruptcy Act
in order to better accomplish the bankruptcy policy of equitable distribu-
tion. In addition to examining the general policy of the two acts, we
must also look at the problem from the point of view of the policy of
specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. The reason for the section
64a priorities is to encourage efficient administration." The Fidelity
Tube decision does just the opposite.
Also, the government's favored position can cause considerable hard-
ship to others, e.g., attorneys and employees. Congress has sought to in-
sure active and efficient administration of bankrupt estates by allowing
the attorney to collect his fee under the first priority of section 64a.63
But as was shown earlier, many cases are no asset cases. The attorney is
less likely to put forth his best efforts, if he accepts the case at all, when
there are tax liens outstanding. He can usually be confident that the lien
60. 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4702 (3d ed. 1943)
says: "'There is no safer nor better settled canon of interpretation than that when
language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly expresses.'"
61. In the Fidelity Tube Case, it was not a question of Congress not providing pro-
tection for the class of creditor involved. It was a question of the courts construing the
words "judgment creditor" as not to include a trustee in bankruptcy when § 70c of the
Bankruptcy Act expressly provides that the trustee should have all the rights, remedies,
and powers of a creditor holding a lien on the property through legal or equitable pro-
ceedings. See note 34 supra. This construction plus the requirement that the judgment
creditor have a lien, see note 37 supra, has greatly narrowed the class of judgment credi-
tors who are protected.
62. See Cohen v. United States, 115 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1940) ; In the Matter of
John Horne Co., 124 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ill. 1954), aff'd. 220 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1955).
63. "The debts to have priority. . . . and one reasonable attorney's fee, for the pro-
fessional services actually rendered, irrespective of the number of attorneys employed,
to the petitioning creditors in involuntary cases and to the bankrupt in voluntary and
involuntary cases, .... " Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 11 U.S.C. § 104a. For a good dis-
cussion of the subject of legal fees in bankruptcy see, Reich, Let's Talk About Fees, 59
Com. L.J. 108 (1954).
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will prevail, and his chances of recovery for his services are diminished. 4
The plight of employees of the bankrupt is even sadder than that of at-
torneys. Generally, they will not quit their jobs before bankruptcy be-
cause of sociological and economic reasons." Thus they are almost
forced to sink or swim with the bankrupt. Congress has recognized this
plight by granting them a second priority under section 64a."0 The wage
earner's needs are usually much more serious and much more immediate
than those of the government.0 The analogy to the Tort Claims Case is
especially cogent in this area, and the courts could give relief by applying
the plain meaning rule in interpreting the Bankruptcy Act and the Code. 8
Thus we see that the results of the Gilbert9 and Fidelity Tube
cases7 0 are unfortunate and probably unwise. That there is a great deal
of discontent with these decisions and many others which give the gov-
ernment an almost impregnable position is obvious. The practicing bar
has attempted to introduce legislation,"' many writers have expressed dis-
satisfaction with the results,72 and the state and lower federal court
judges have actually attempted to change the judicially created laws only
to be reversed by the Supreme Court on appeal. 73  This problem of com-
64. Since he probably would not prevail over the tax lien, supra note 53, and since
less than twenty percent of the cases where the bankrupt is given a discharge are asset
cases, supra note 6, the attorney's only alternative is to demand security for his services.
See Reich, supra note 63.
65. R EYNOLDS & S ISTER, JOB HoaizoNs, 1949. "Out of his employment experience
the worker develops a set of basic attitudes and beliefs about jobs: a definition of what
constitutes a 'good job,' a feeling that job opportunities are scarce and valuable, a
strong attachment to a particular plant and a articular community . . . ." Id. at 83-84.
"[T]he worker who has located a 'good job' quickly develops a marked attachment to
it and a strong aversion to change. . . ." Id. at 87.
66. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 104a(2). See also 4 COLLIER § 67.27.
67. The government's total revenue for any one year is not adversely affected by
the fact that in the single case of the trustee in bankruptcy, it does not prevail. Also
the government has a ready source of credit when it needs money. The individual em-
ployee, on the other hand, generally does not have substantial savings to fall back on,
and his avenues of credit are usually cut off abruptly when he becomes jobless.
68. Here the government could very easily spread this loss over the whole nation,
and no one taxpayer would be adversely affected. If the wage earner, however, were
made to bear the loss, it might be unduly burdensome.
69. See note 3 supra.
70. See note 1 supra.
71. See note 58 supra.
72. See MacLachlan, supra note 58; Kennedy, supra note 44; and Cross, supra note
44.
73. For cases where lower court opinions were reversed on appeal to the Supreme
Court see, United States v. Scovil, supra note 19; United States v. Liverpool and Lon-
don and Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955) ; United States v. Gilbert Associates, supra
note 3; United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank; supra note 20; United States v.
Acri, supra note 20; United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn Inc., 323 U.S. 353
(1945).
NOTES
plete government supremacy is of judicial origin" and could have been
avoided by never inventing the inchoate lien doctrine. As to the trustee
in bankruptcy, the problem could have been avoided by applying the plain
meaning rule to both the Bankruptcy Act and the Code. Allowing the
trustee to be a judgment creditor under 6323 would not put the govern-
ment at any serious disadvantage either. The only time the government
could possibly be hurt would be when it engages in the practice of non-
recording of its lien. 5
LANDLORD AND TENANT: DEFECTS EXISTING AT THE
TIME OF THE LEASE
In the bailment and sale of chattels the law of negligence has im-
posed on the bailor and seller a duty to exercise reasonable care in in-
specting and preparing a chattel so that it will be safe for its intended use.
Implied warranties have developed in the sale of chattels. But caveat
emptor still prevails in the sale and leasing of real property; and the lia-
bility of the landlord for injuries caused the tenant by defects existing in
the premises at the time of the demise continues to be the subject of much
litigation although the courts treat the law as well settled. The general
rule is stated to be that the landlord is not liable-caveat lessee-on the
theory that the tenant assumes the risk of defective conditions existing at
the time the lease is execued.' But the exception early developed that the
landlord was liable if he knew of a defect and the tenant was unaware of
it and could not have discovered it by a reasonable inspection Thus,
74. Before 1929, the inchoate lien doctrine was not used at all by the Supreme
Court and before 1950 it was used only in cases arising under § 3466 of the Revised
Statutes. See text accompanying notes 48-51. Thus the dilemma is of the Court's own
making.
75. The federal tax lien is valid as against anybody except a mortgagee, pledgee,
purchaser or judgment creditor without filing. United States v. Toys of the World-
Club, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; In re Litt, 128 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Pa.
1955). It is valid as against a mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor pro-
vided it has been filed before the competing lien became specific and perfected. United
States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, supra note 20; United States v. Kings County
Iron Works, 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Phillips, 198 F.2d 634
(5th Cir. 1952).
1. Valin v. Jewell, 88 Conn. 151, 90 At. 36 (1914); Whitman v. Oronor Pulp &
Paper Co., 91 Me. 297, 39 Atl. 1032 (1892) ; Bowe v. Hunking, 135 Mass. 380 (1883) ;
Marshman v. Stanley, 122 N.E.2d 482 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952) ; Stewart v. Raleigh County
Bank, 121 W. Va. 181, 2 S.E.2d 274 (1939).
2. Wilson v. Lamberton, 102 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1924); Shotwell v. Bloom, 60 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 140 P.2d 728 (1943); Wilensky v. Perell, 72 So. 2d 278 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
1954); Borggard v. Gale, 107 Ill. App. 128, aff'd, 205 II1. 511, 68 N.E. 1063 (1903);
